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ABSTRACT
In this paper, a new technique for ensuring run-time satisfaction of properties-specifically
responsiveness property, a subset of liveness property, in responsive systems, is presented. Since
whether the run-time behavior of a system is satisfied depends on the execution (operational)
environment, we develop a translation which takes into account the constraints in the operational
environment, and generates histories for each process in the system. Thus, every process can uti
lize its history to operationally evaluate the system behavior and signal errors if its history is vio
lated. Therefore, this technique provides software safety, handles error-detection, and ensures
run-time satisfaction of responsiveness property in the operational environment. To illustrate
this approach a train set example is presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
A responsive system [Male90] is one which responds to internal programs or external
inputs in a timely, dependable and predictable manner. In such life-critical system, any failure
can cause catastrophe, and ensuring run-time satisfaction of assertions-expected behavior, is a
necessity. This motivates our work of developing a technique for ensuring run-time satisfaction
of system behavior.
This technique of ensuring run-time satisfaction of expected behavior, characterized by
assertions, is as follows. First, a sound mathematical basis-interval Temporal Logic(ITL) is pro
vided to model responsiveness property, a subset of liveness property, of the system. Then, in
order to apply responsiveness property in the operational environment, a transformation taking
into account the constraints of the operational environment is developed. The transformation
helps processes create histories, with a consistent view, for all the (local) operations in the sys
tem. Therefore, processes can make use of their histories to operationally evaluate, at intermedi
ary or observable stages, the behavior of other processes-this avoids self-evaluation. If a history
is violated, which means the expected behavior is violated, then an error is signaled. Therefore,
the operational evaluation of responsiveness property-expected behavior, provides not only errordetection but software safety.
This approach-operational evaluation o f assertions provides software safety through
implicit redundancy, since safety constraints or run-time satisfaction are examined upon the com
munications. There are other approaches to cope with dependencies in the execution environ
ment. In [Mok91], implementation dependencies, e.g., architecture or resource constraints, are
explicitly identified and are brought in as need. In other words, the implementation dependencies
are isolated first and then they check if system specification and the required implementation
dependencies can be enforced by control structures that meet the required timing constraints.
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The proposed approach is based on Changeling [LuMc91b, LuSM92, LuSM92a], which
chooses axiomatic proof system as the mathematical model and uses assertions generated from
the proof outline to detect errors. However, this paper focuses on establishing run-time satisfac
tion of system behavior-characterized by responsiveness property, for the life-critical system.
The responsiveness property shows progress of the system behavior, and can be established
by applying the proof rules of ITL. At run time, the property is evaluated against a time-index
computation history collected by processes of the system. If the history is not violated, then it is
ensured run-time satisfaction of responsiveness property, i.e., the system does what it supposes to
do.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the logic ITL which can be used to
model and reason about responsiveness property in life-critical systems. Then, a translation pro
cedure allowing operational evaluation of responsiveness property is presented in Section 3. In
Section 4, the complexity of the translation and operational evaluation o f assertions is addressed
in terms of computation cost and communication cost. Section 5 illustrates, on a train set exam
ple, the technique-operationally ensuring run-time satisfaction, and analyizes the overhead
incurred by this technique. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Interval Temporal Logic
In this section, we developed a logic for the design and analysis of safety-critical systems.
In such systems, bounded response is crucial and one failure can cause a catastrophe. The logic
is called Interval Temporal Logic(ITL), which supports the analysis of responsiveness propertiesa subset of the liveness properties. This ITL is an extension o f Interleaving Set Temporal
Logic(ISTL*) [PePn90], which adopts a partial order semantics. Hence, the logic ITL captures
the temporal and distributed aspects of responsive systems.
The interval formulas of ITL have the form [

: the formula a holds on the interval [/]; if

the interval [/] can not be found then the interval formula is vacuously true. An interval [/] is
bounded by assertions. For instance, let s, be the assertion which characterizes the state at posi
tion i in a behavior cr; [st,

sj] denotes the interval

j. Interval formulas are

ify properties within "bounded" intervals of time.
Definition 2.1: Any formula in the language ITL is a path formula, while a state formula is one
containing no intervals or temporal operators, and is interpretable on a single state.
From the above definition, we know that interval formulas are path formulas. The follow
ing definitions are needed before the satisfaction definitions.
Definition 2.2: If a state s satisfies a state formula </>,then we say that j is a

state.
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Definition 2 3 : Let £ be a sequence of states and £(/) be the ith state of £. An interval [p, q],
bounded by state formulas p and q, is given by [p,

= {£| £(0)t=p, £(I£I)N<?}. Here, l£l denotes

the length of the state sequence £, and t= denotes the satisfaction.
Definition 2.4: Let R (c) = {£| £ ^ cr}, where the state sequence £ = (£ (0 ),. . . . £(l£l)) refines

a = (cr(0),. . . ,

ct(IctI)).

a ,iff (3

In symbols, £ <

[0, Icxl]) ((tr(j'), er(j

In other words, R(cr) is the collection of subsequences o f the state sequence cr.
Definition 2.5: The following satisfaction definitions are to be added to the semantics of the
logic ISTL*. Let 0 be any formula, and let p, q be state formulas.

i)\=y/

(cr,

=

(a,i)\=[p,q]<j>

= for

a{i)\=y/,where yris a state formula.
every

£e/?(cr)

such

that

(£ ,0 )h p ,

and

(£, l£l)l=<?,

if

(3^-e { 0 , 1 , . . . , l£l })(£(£,) = cr(0), then (£, kt)

(j\=<p

= V i e { 0 , . . . , Icrl}, (cr,

crK p]0

= (Vi) (if (cr, i)t= p then (cr, i)l=0).

crHp.

i)\=0.

q]EP0 = For all £e R(cr) such that (£, 0)1=p, and (£, l£l)N<?, we have (£, l£l)b=0.

Definition 2.6: A responsiveness assertion is a path formula of the form
where

p,q, 0, and

tflEFyc),

\pare state formulas.

([p]0—
»[p, c/]EFyc) is true over a state sequen
lowing holds: 0 holds at p. state of cr, then a \p. state will occur within the interval [p, q]. The
assertion ensures the requirement of a timed response y/to 0 within the time interval [p, q]. The
A responsiveness assertion

following Progress Rule can be applied to reason about responsiveness properties.
Let p, q, r, 00,0 X,

02be state formulas.

Progress Rule:

[p]<Po^>[p, q]EF0i
\h>[g.
W
[p]<t>o^>[p, r]E¥02

20X
_
E
Jr _______

According to the premises, if 0Qholds at p. state, then there exists a path or state sequence

0iwill occur within the interval [p,q], and if 0X holds at then there exists a
path 0X will occur within the interval [q, r]. Therefore, we can conclude that if 0O holds at
such that

p. state, then there exists a state sequence such that

will occur within the time interval [p, r\.

The following remark and definitions are needed for the proofs of soundness and complete
ness of the Progress Rule.
Remark: A program
sequence cr is generated by P iff crhXp.

Pan
c be identified with any collection

of formulas, such that a

-
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Psi a program, then 'LP\=<t>(read "<p is a consequence of Up") means every sta

Definition 2.7: If

sequence cr generated by P satisfies <t>.
Definition 2.8: Given a program P and a formula(property) <f>,we say P satisfies the specification

Theorem 1 (Soundness): The Progress Rule is sound.
Proof: Assume that all the premises hold, i.e.,
( 1 ) Z/.l=[p]0o->[p> tf]EF0 ,, and

ZpHq]</>i^>[q,r] EF02.

(2)

Let cr be an arbitrary state sequence generated by P,i.e., cri=X/». Then,
(3) For all i, (cr,

i)Hp]^>o~^[p,<?]EF0 ,, and

(4) For all i, (cr,

i)Hq]0i~>[q,r]EF^2.

The im p lication^ ) of the equation (3) can be removed, and (3) is equivalent to "if
(cr,f)l=[p]^o» then (cr,/)(=[/>> <7]EF0 ,." Thus, <px holds at

where tq is a time index of any

q. state in state sequence cr. That is, (cr, tq)k=</>\, i.e.,
(5) <r\=[q]<t>iLikewise, the im p lication^ ) of the equation (4) can be removed, and we can rewrite (4) as
"if (cr,

i)k=[q]</>i,then (cr, /)(=[<?, r]EF<z)2 " From (4) and (5), we can derive (cr,/)H<Z, r]EF02.
tr)^<j>2,and (cr, i)\=[p, r]EF<z>2.

Symmetrically, we can conclude (cr,

<rt=[p]<t>o—>[p, r]EF02. So
KP> r]EF^2, which means that every state sequence generated by P satisfies

Hence,

for

all

(cr,/)t=[p]^ 0_^[p* r]EF^2.

/,

Thus

(l>]0o->[p> r] EF02).d

Theorem 2 (Relative Completeness): Suppose

is a program, ([p]<Po^[p, tf]EF02) is a respon

siveness assertion, and for each state sequence cr of P, if crH[p]0o“ HP> <?]EF02). Then
E
q] F02).

Xp\-([p]<t>o^>[p,

Proof: From the assumption hpk=[p]</>o->[p, r]EF02, we need to show that there exists a proof
for [p]</>o~>[p, r]EF02. Let cr be an arbitrary state sequence generated by P,i.e., crt=X/>. Then,
from the assumption, we know that cr\=[p]<t>o—>[p, r]EF02. Now [p]<t>o—>[p, r]EF^2 holds on a
sequence cr = (.yo^i, • • •), if whenever there exist indexes t0, t2, and j, such that (cr,tQ)\=p,
(cr, t2)f=r, <fi0 holds on s,0, and

tt2, </>2 holds on crl[;>,2] = (Sj, sJ+x, . . . , s t2).

Let t\ = max{th 0 < t < t 2 and crt=[t0, t]-><t>2}, i.e., t x is the last point where ~><t>2 holds. Let
f, = min{tl/0 ^

t < t 2and crt=[t, / 2]^2 },i.e„ t x is the first point where <j>2 holds.

-

<j>x =at{tx)and

Let

£ p H > ]0 o-H /M 1 e f 0 i >
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</>l = a t(f x);

let

£pH tf] 0i->[<7,£lE F 0 i,

and

let

)
So,

XPH[p]<Po^>[P> q JE F fa n
3. THE TRANSLATION SCHEME
In Section 2, we developed a formal tool ITL for modeling the behaviors of reactive sys
tems within finite intervals o f time. The behavior is represented by responsiveness assertions.
To show that responsiveness is guaranteed in the execution environment, a translation procedure
which takes into account the constraints in the operational environment is developed. This trans
lation helps every process create a global scheduled history) for all the (local) operations of the
responsive(distributed) system. Meanwhile, processes can utilize their histories to evaluate, at
observable stages, the behavior of the system characterized by responsiveness assertions. If any
of the assertions are violated, then an error has occurred. Thus, the incorporations of the transla
tion and operational evaluation of responsiveness assertions define an error-detecting algorithm.
The following steps outline the generation of error-detecting algorithms.
(1) obtain responsiveness assertions from ITL specifications: the logic ITL adopts partial
order semantics and provides a more suitable representation of concurrency than inter
leaving semantics does.
(2 ) develop a translation procedure: in the translation, every process maintains a history-a
global view of the system through a set of auxiliary variables. These variables are used
to keep track of the operations performed and observed in the system.
(3) derive error-detecting algorithms: run-time correctness is established by evaluating
responsiveness assertions-obtained in the verification environment, against the history.
This step is called operational evaluation of responsiveness assertion, which allows
distributed processes to monitor, within finite intervals of time, whether their behavior
is satisfied or not. Hence, an error-detecting algorithm is generated.
For a process P{, the evaluation of responsiveness on process Pj requires the information
about Pj. Thus, auxiliary variables are used to communicate variables in the assertions, which
allows processes to evaluate responsiveness assertions or the behaviors of other processes.
Hence, we can avoid having a process test itself. Now, we formally describe the operations for
the translation. The following definition describes the actions with respect to auxiliary variables
in the translation.
Definition 3.1: Let tt and tj denote the local counters of processes Pt and Pj, respectively. The
actions performed in the translation include updates of auxiliary variables, sending and receiving
messages, which are described below.

and

let

-

( P y ,U , v):
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P j\,v ,t () in CSP [Hoar69] notation, which denotes that a message

(

with content v is sent to process Py at time t{ with respect to the
clock of process P f.

(Pj, ?, th v):

(P jlv, ti) in CSP notation, which denotes that a message with content
v is received from process

at time

with respect to the clock of

process Pf.

(tj,Vi, . . . , v„):

at time tj, the variables Vj,. . . , v„ are instantiated in process Pj.

t(o f a process P( is incremented by one after every execution of an operation and is

The counter

updated after the receipt of a message. The incorporation of logical clocks into the translation is
to obtain a total ordering of all causally related events of the system, which is based on the con
cept of a “happened before” relation [Lamp78].
To keep track of operations, each process must maintain a history that records all the opera
tions performed and observed so far, which is defined below.
Definition 3.2: Let Vh, be the collection of operations observed by process Pj, where the opera
tions are described in Definition 3.1. Vh. is used to keep track of the operations involving state
variables in the assertions to be evaluated. These state variables in assertions are referred to as
auxiliary variables.
Each process keeps a collection of sets of auxiliary variables with respect to the other pro
cesses in the system, so that every process has state information of other processes and can eval
uate whether an assertion about the behavior of other processes is satisfied. The following defi
nition describes the auxiliary variables maintained by process Pj with respect to n processes in
the system.
Definition 3 3 : Let Gy be a collection o f subsets g jo ,g j\,...,g j(n-i)’ where each subset is a set of

gjiij^O represents the cha

operations from Definition 3.1. The set

variables in Pj since the last communication with P,; gjj describes the auxiliary variables
updated by process P j since the last communication with any process.

gjiij^O can be considered as a queue o f process Pj to be s

Notice that each set

communication with process P(. Before the communication with P,, Py updates its queues

(gJQ, . . . , g

g y(l+1), .. .,g

with respect to the operations in gjj, which records all the

operations since last communication with any process. Also, the global view or the history Vh. is
updated with respect to
before two processes communicate.

gjj .The following definition describes these operations to be per

-
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u p d a t e bc( g jitg
jj,

Definition 3.4: The function

V

)jbescri
d

before the communication with P,.

update bc(gjitgjj,Vh.,tj
(1) apply each operation in

(Gj\{gjj});

to

Vhj^ V h.\\gjJ;

(2)

I

( 3)

tj\=

(4)
The above equations are explained below.
(1) update (Gj\{gjj}) with respect to

gjj,where "\" denotes set difference.
gjj, where "II" denotes concatenation.

(2) record operations in

gjjis set to empty, since (Gj\{ gjj }) are updated.

(3)

(4) increment the counter

tj.

Before the communication, processes P, and Pj perform their respective updates of

updatebc(gtj, gtt,

Vhi,

tt)and

updatebc(gn ,

g}},Vhj,

communicate. The operations in updatebc are performed before the communication. The fol
lowing definition formally defines the operations following the communication of non-auxiliary
variables.

updateacdescribes the communications of auxiliary

Definition 3.5: The function

the updates following the exchanges of auxiliary variables, let Vh. be the collection of opera
tions observed by P, and let grecv denote the auxiliary variables received by P, from Pj. The
following function describes the operations performed by P,-.__________

updateac(gijtgrecv, Vhrti)
t, grecv)',t,:=max(t<, 0 + 1;

(1) (Py, ?,

(2)v„i<-vlli\KPj,‘? ,t,grecv
(3) (Py, !,*„*<,);

t,: = t, + 1;

( ^ V ^ V ^ K P j.U th g9)\
( 5 ) V,i<-V/,ll grecv-,
(6)

tj\=?,-+!;_____

-
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The above equations are explained as follows.
(1) receive auxiliary variables of Py in grecv, and increment the counter th
(2) record the operation of (1) in Vhj.
(3) send

gyto process Py and increment the clock th

(4) record the operation of (3) in Vhj.
(5) record the operations of grecv in history

Vhi.

(6) increment the counter tt.
Observe that, in (5), there is no need to consider duplicate tuples and we can append grecv
to the history Vh. of process P, directly, since all the operations in grecv are instantiated by pro
cess Pj. The function updateac(g]h grecv,

P j(j < i), has the same operations as in

Vhj,tj), which describes the

updateac(gij,grecv, V/,., tt) except t

its queue gJ( before it waits to receive the auxiliary variables of P(, gtj. Notice that (j < ) is
used to introduce an arbitrary order to the communications of auxiliary variables, which
avoids the occurrence of deadlock. The interchange of auxiliary variables is described in Fig
ure 3.1 for one matching communication pair between Pt and Py.

3.1 Soundness and Completeness of the Translation
This section shows that the assertions, derived from the verification proof or the verifica
tion environment, can be preserved after the transformation. The transformation is a process
which considers operational constraints and generates a consistent view for distributed pro
cesses of the system. In [TsIM93], we have shown soundness and relative completeness of the
translation with respect to all formulas(properties) except interval formulas of the form

[p, q\(p. Now we have to show that the translation preserves soundness and relative complete
ness with respect to interval formulas. Then, responsiveness assertions ([p]tp->[p, q]EFys)
can be obtained from interval formulas and implication. Therefore, responsiveness assertions
are preserved after the translation, i.e., they are preserved in the operational environment.
Let

1 Pidentify the collection of formulas for program P. Let TR(1P) identify the collec

tion of formulas for the corresponding program of P after the translation.

Then

TR(1P) = Ip^jS, where S is the collection of formulas for the operations of update and the
communications of auxiliary variables in the translation. lp<zTR(lP), since the translation
helps processes to communicate their views of the system, and affects neither program vari
ables nor the control of flow.

Thus,

TR(1P
) includes 1 P, in

las(assertions) which describe update operations and the communications o f auxiliary vari
ables. Notice that if a formula <pe S, then $ can be derived from 1 P using the same proof rules

-
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F or process P j’.
/* execute arbitrary set of statements excluding communication */
/*but including assignments to auxiliary variables */

s„; tj:=1
Si2> t| :=tj + 1

***7
Siki tj^tj + l
/* update the auxiliary variables */
updatebc(g1J,g 1„ V hi,ti);
/* perform communications with process Pj */
(Pj?VAR, t); ti:=max(tl, t) + 1
/* and update the auxiliary variables */
updateac(gy, grecv, Vh(, tj),
For process Pj:
/* execute arbitrary set of statements excluding communication
/*but including assignments to auxiliary variables */
Sji; t,:=1
Sj2; lj :=tJ + 1
• * *9

sjk; tj:=tj + 1
/* update the auxiliary variables */
updatebc(gji, gjj, Vhj, tj);
/* perform communications with process Pj */
(Pi !VAR,t);tj:=tj + 1
/* and update the auxiliary variables */
updateac(g[j, greCv>Vbj, tj),
Figure 3.1. communications of auxiliary variables for one matching communication pair.

(i.e., Xph0), since both environments have the same proof rules and we can inductively show
that the weakest predicate of

<p is

true in the verification environm ent^ N0).

The interval formula [p, q]</>describes a sequence of operations and contains no auxiliary
variables, where p and q are state formulas and

is a path formula. The following two

-11
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Verification Environment

Operational Environment

Soundness:
2 Pl-[p»

fianslatiqn

=> E pK p . q]<t>

Soundness:
77?(Zp)Kp, $]* => 77?(Zp)l=[p,

Relative Completeness:

Relative Completeness:

q\<j>^ Epl—[p, q](j>

SpNfp,

R{Xp)N[p,

77?(Sp)l-[p,

theorems show that the translation preserves soundness and relative completeness in the opera
tional environment.

TR(LP)\-[p,q]<p, then TR(LP)^[p, q]<p. That is, if th

Theorem 3 (Soundness): If

in the operational environment, then [p, q]<j>is true in the operational environment.

of [p>

Proof: First we need to show that there is a proof of [p, q]<p in the verification environment.
By

assumption,

we

know

that there

environment(77?(Ep)l-[p, q]0).

is

a proof of

TR(ZP)\-[p, q\<t> says

that

[p,

in the

there

exists

operational
a

TR(<f>0),TR{px\ . . . , TR(<j)n_x)o f formulas such that the consequence TR(t/>n_x) is [p,

sequence
and

each formula can be obtained from the previous formulas by the proof rules from the proof
system.
For each formula TR(<j>k) (0 <

k<
n), if TR{<j>k) contains auxiliary variable

results from the execution of update or communication of auxiliary variables, then we can
replace TR(</>k) by a sequence TR(<j>ko), TR(<pkt) , . . . , TR(0kJ of formulas having no auxiliary
variables, because l.P\=TR(</)k).

<Pq,

...,

Thus, we can construct a corresponding sequence

0n-\°f formulas, such that each TR(<pk) has a corresponding formula <t>k in the veri

fication environment.
Since we have shown soundness in the verification environment, [p, q]<l> is true for all
executions in the verification environment, i.e. S Pl=[p> q\<p. Then [p, q]<p is true in the opera
tional environment

(TR(ZP)h[p, q\<t>), because 'LP<z1TR('LP) = (LPuS), and £ Pl=S.n

Theorem 4 (Relative Completeness): If

TR(ZP)then TR(LP)\-[

[p, q]<p is true in the operational environment, then there is a proof o f [p, q]</> in the opera
tional environment.

q\0si true in the operational environment (TR(ZP)t=[p, q]fi), first we need to
show that [p, q]<t> is true in the verification environment. TR(LP)\=[p, q)<p says that given an
Proof: If [p,

-
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arbitrary computation cr,

K
a p>

ie. , [p, q\<t>is true in the operational environment

o 'be an arbitrary computation in the verification (<t'NZp). Let a be the computation
obtained from a by introducting the transitions of update and communications of auxiliary
variables. In other words,
a 'is a projection of a (cr' = n(cr)). Since is a compu
operational environment (a\=TR(LP)), a ' = II(<r), and o\=[p,
we have <r'l=[p, q]<P- Then
EPh [p , q]<j), i.e., [p, q\<p is true in the verification environment. Thus, EPKp> q]^* since we
Let

have shown relative completeness in the verification environment. EPl-[p, q\<P says that there
exists a seq u e n c e^ , $x, . .

<t>n-\)of formulas such that the consequence [p, q]<

each formula can be obtained from the previous formulas by proof rules in the proof system.
Now we need to show that there is a proof o f [p, q](j> in the operational environment.
That is, in the operational environment there exists a sequence TR(</>0), TR(<f>x) , . . . ,

• • ,</>n 1 of formulas in the verification environment.
Since both environments have the same proof rules, each </>
t is TR(<px) in the operational envi

which correspond to the sequence

ronment. Thus, we can construct a corresponding sequence TR(4>0), TR{<f>x) , . . . , TR(<pn^x) of
formulas in the operational environment. This concludes that in the operational environment
there is a proof of [p, q]<j>, i.e., TR(LP)\-[p, q\<pn

3.2. OPERATIONAL EVALUATION OF RESPONSIVENESS ASSERTIONS
We have shown that the translation process defines a global schedule (a history) for all
the local operations of processes in the distributed system. This history is defined in terms of
multiple clock readings through the incorporation of a "happened before" relation[Lamp78].
This section describes how processes can utilize their own histories to check the satisfaction of
responsiveness assertions in the execution environment.
The idea is that the run-time satisfaction of responsiveness assertions is guaranteed if
there exist no tuples in a history that violate the assertion to be evaluated. Notice that in the
verification we check all possible behavior or execution sequences to conclude that a respon
siveness assertion is satisfied. However, in the operational environment, we examine if a his
tory is ever violated, i.e., if there exists a tuple in the history Vh which satisfies the negation of
the assertion to be evaluated. If so, an error has occurred. The evaluation of responsiveness
assertions is formally defined below.
Definition 3.6: Let V,, be the collection of tuples, which records the operations observed by a
process in a distributed system. The tuples of Vh are o f the form (t, v1? v2, . . . , v„), which
denotes the instances o f Vj, v2, . . . , v„ at time t.
Definition 3.7: Point violation-a formula (j) is violated in a history Vn, iff there exists a tuple

-
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Q = {t, v1? v2, . . . , v„) such that
In symbols, there exists a mapping II on the history Vh
and a formula 0, n(V,„ <p) ={Q\ Qfr<t>}. In particular, [T]<j> is violated in the history
iff the
se tn (V „ , [T]<j>)

={Q = (t,v u v., „)l Q M and i s nonempty.

Definition 3.8: Interval violation-an interval formula [Tx,T 2]</>is violated in a history Vh iff

[Tx, T2]</>)={Q = (t,v x....v„)l

the set IICV,,,

Qfrand

Definition 3.9: An responsiveness formula G X )]^—>[7^,
iff

the

nCV,,,

set

[Tu

n(V/,,

T2]EF</>2)

is satisfied for a history Vh

[T\\<t>\)is empty,
={Q= (t,v, , . . . , v„)l Q\=<t>2 and

and

This section examines the overhead o f operational evaluations of assertions from two
aspects-computation cost and communication cost. First, we consider the computation cost
incurred by the translation and operational evaluations of assertions. Upon communications,
assertions are examined against a history Vh. If there is a violation in the history Vh, then an
error is signaled. The overhead of evaluating an assertion, i.e., II(V/(, assertion), is described
below.
For a process with m operations, there are at most m tuples created, one tuple for
each operation involving the modifications of auxiliary variables. Notice that auxil
iary variables are state variables in the assertions to be evaluated, and no tuples are
generated for those operations involving no auxiliary variables. In other words, it is
sufficient to maintain relevant state information for the evaluation of assertions.
•

The overhead of maintaining a consistent view(V/() for a process is 0(m n)-every pro
cess has to maintain a copy of auxiliary variables for n processes in the system.
Thus, the length of Vh or the number of tuples in Vh is at most mn.

In summary, the cost of operationally evaluating an assertion is O(mn) which accounts for the
examination of mn tuples in Vh after a communication. Since there are C communications(i.e., C evaluations o f assertions), O(mnxC) is the computation cost induced by the trans
lation and the operational evaluations of assertions. However, the length of history Vh is prob
lem-dependent. The maximum length of Vh is mn, which can be reduced as follows. Let’s
say, the evaluation Yl(Vtl, assertionx) is ahead of the evaluation Y[(Vh,assertion2), and there
are no evaluations in between. If the time indexes of

n(V/„

set

T2]} is empty as wel

4. COMPLEXITY

•

the

2) are later or greater

than those o f n(V/,, assertion^), then the history Vh can be chopped off, i.e., the tuples in Vh
can be removed up to the one with the largest time index in II(VA, assertion]). The reason is

-

14

-

that the time indexes of tuples in Vh are generated according to a "happened before" [Lamp78]
relation, and there are no overlapped time indexes between the sets FI(V,/i, assertion) and
n (V ft, assertion2), so there is no need to keep the tuples for

lt

Then, we consider the overhead of communication. In the translation, exchanges o f aux
iliary variables are needed to maintain a consistent view among processes in the system. The
exchanges of auxiliary variables occur after each communication o f non-auxiliary variables.
For the sake of efficiency, auxiliary variables are piggybacked in the communication. There
fore, the number of communications of auxiliary variables incurred by the translation is C,
where C is the number of communications in the underlying algorithm.
Notice that the piggybacking of auxiliary variables does not incur much cost. This can
be understood as follows. The time to transfer data between two processes is (5 + RL), where

S is the setup time, R is the transfer rate(in secs/byte), and L is the length of the message.
Typically numbers, for a Sun 4/20 using TCP/IP on an IEEE CSMA/CD, yield, S = 16msec,
and R is (\0Mb/sec )~] . The additional message will affect the transfer time, when RL > S,
this happens when L > 104, and for a lObytes message, mn > 1000.
To sum up, the communications introduced by the translation is linearly proportional to
the communications in the underlying algorithm, while the computation cost can be greatly
reduced when the time indexes in the assertins to be evaluated are not overlapped.

5. TRAIN SET EXAMPLE
Safety-critical systems usually involve the interactions between the controller and the
physical process. In the train set example [LeSW92, LeSA92], the physical process consists
of primary track circuit Cp and secondary track circuit Cs, and two types of train-

and Ts.

The circuits are divided into sections and there are two crossing sections where the two cir
cuits intersect. Each section has a sensor, while for each train, there is an actuator that can
stop the train within any section. To avoid accidents, a train has to get permission from Cir
cuit to enter the next section, and get permission from DANGER_ZONE to enter the danger
zone(crossing section). The circuit Cp, Cs, and the crossing section CC are illustrated below.

-
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Figure 5.1. The train set circuits and the crossing section
Behavior of Sensors and Actuators
In this example, we are concerned with those failures o f sensor or actuator that can affect
the safety of the system. For example, the sensor failure that misses a train or the actuator fail
ure that fails to stop a train. The behavior and failure behavior of the sensors and actuators are
defined after the following description of the variables to be used.
•

c denotes type of circuit, ce

•

x, ydenote trains,

•

i,j are sections, i, j e

•

L ={ p, s }.
x, ye Tr={ 1 , . . . ,

N }tc.

Sc ={ 0 , . . . , N sc}.

Addition ® and subtraction © on section numbers are performed modulo the number
of sections of the circuit.

Txldenote the time when train x enters section /, and let Txj denote

Definition 5.1: Let
point o f time immediately before Txi®\■

Definition 5.2: The behavior of a sensor is denoted by SS(x, i)-a sensor detects train x in sec
tion i. The failure behavior of a sensor is denoted by FS(x, i)-a sensor fails to detect a train x
in

section

FS(x, 0 =

i.
Thus,
on(x,c)A~>Sens(c, Ptrain(x)).

SS(x,

= on(x,

Definition 5.3: The behavior of an actuator is denoted by SS(x, j)-v/hen the actuator is set,
train x cannot enter a new section. The failure behavior of an actuator is denoted by

FA(x,j)- when the actuator of train x is set, train x enters a new section. Thus,
SS(x, j) =
([Txj](A
ctx,)APtrain(x) = j))
a ([
= j);
FA(x, j) = ([Txi](Act(x, i)APtrain(x) = i)A([Txi, TxM]Ptrain(x) > i).
Appendix A shows the algorithm o f train, circuit and section, where Ptr, Pc, and Ps
denote the processes train, ciruit, and sections, respectively. Process Ps informs processes Pc
and Ptr upon a detection of a train entering a section. Process circuit-

localizes sensor and

-
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Comments

On(x, c)

train x is on circuit c

Ptrain(x)

the position(section) contains
the front of a train x

Rtrain(x)

the set of sections that are re
served by a train x on Circuit c

Sens(c, i)

sensor of section i detects a
train on circuit c.

Act(x, j)

Act{x,j) is set to stop train x
on section j.

Shut_Down

Shut_Down holds when all
trains must be stopped, i.e., all
actuators are set.

Figure 5.2. The state variables
actuator failures. Pc signals minor failure if the number o f consecutive sensor failures is less
than or equal to a constant mcsf. Major failure occurs if an actuator fails to stop a train, or the
number of consecutive sensor failures is greater than mcsf.
Figure 5.3 shows the safety constraints that must be guaranteed by the system. These
safety constraints are represented by ITL formulas and can be operationally evaluated accord
ing to the mapping defined in Section 3.1. The reservation constraint(SCl) states that for any
train, the current occupied section and the following mcsf©l sections must always be
reserved. The exclusion constraint(SC2) asserts that mutual exclusion must be achieved for
reserved sections, i.e., no section can be reserved by more than one train. SC3 is a responsive
ness property, which says that if the number of consecutive sensor failures is greater than

mcsf, then the system must be shut down. SC3 can be formalized and proved by Progress
Rule as follows.
Let Txl denote the time when train x enters section /. Let TXJ denote the point of time
immediately before Tx m - The sensor failures on section

ican be represented

siveness assertion: [Txl, Txj] EF(On(c, x)A-'Sens(c, Ptrain(x))). Likewise, we can derive the
corresponding formulas for the sensor failures of the following m csf sections. By Progress
Rule and the following premises, we can conclude [Txt, Txie,llcsj-]
words, if the following premises hold,

In other

-
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ITL formulas

Safety Constraints

Name
SCI
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Reservation constraint: for any train, the
current occupied section and the following

SC\(Txh Txj) = (V xe Tr)
([Txh Txj]Ptrain(x)i

Rtr

m csf©l sections must always be reserved.
Vc eL, Vxe7r:
{ Ptrain(x)G(mcsf® 1) , . . . . Ptrain(x) }

^Rtrain(x)
SC2

Exclusion constraint: mutual exclusion must
be achieved for reserved sections, i.e., no
section can be reserved by more than one
train:

V ce L, Vx, ye

SC2(Txl, Txj, y)= (Vx, ye

Tr)

(.[Txi, Txj](On(x, c)AOn(y, c)A(x*y)A
Rtrain(x)nRtrain(y)*0)=$ Error.

=>

Rtrain{x)r\Rtrain{y) = 0
SC3

If the number of consecutive sensor failures

Let

is greater than mcsf, then the system must be

([ Txl,Txj](On(c, x ) a

Shut_Down.
V ce L, Vx, ye
[Txi](Ptrain(x) = i ) a
\Txi®mesA(p train(x) > i® mcsf) a

Let

[ Txi

,

c) = (V xe Tr)
~‘Sens(cPtrain(x)

5 C 3 . 1(7^,

SC3.

2(Txt,Txl(Bmcsf, Shut_Down) = (V xe Tr)

[Txi, Txt®mcsf]EF(Shut_Down)).

,P xi® mcsf ]

(~>Sens(c,
Shut_Down.

SC3(Txh
-*Sens(cthen Txl&mcSf) —

i)a• • • a

SC3. \(T xi,
SC3. 1
a SC3.

Txj,

c)a

(Txi^
, jc7®T’ C)A
\(Txi, Txi<£,iicxj-,

~'SC3.2{Txh

c

Txm„icsf,Shut_Down)

=$Error.
SC4

If an actuator ever fails, the system must be
Shut_Down.
and

Shut_Down.

[Txi](Act(x,

=

SC4(Txi, Tx m ) = (V xe 7 » (3 ie Sc)
([Txi](Act(x,i)APtrain(x) =

[Txi,T xim](Ptrain(x)> i)then
[Txi,
Tx m ](Ptrain(x)> i ) a
->([Txi, Tx m ]EF(Shut_Down)))
=>Error.
Figure 5.3. Safety constraints of the system
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[Txl, Txj]EF(On(c,

x)A~>SenPtrain(x)))
[TxM ,Txj^]EF(On(c, ac)a

[y'xi&tuc.sf’ ^ x

EF(On(c,

Ptrciin(x)))

then [Txh Txm ,l(:sj-]EF(->Sens(c,

Ptrain(x))A• • •A~>Sens(c,

tive sensor failures occur, we derive [Txh Txmmsf]

Since

EF(Shut_D own).

SC4 is also a responsiveness assertion. It asserts that if an actuator ever fails, the system
must be shut down. Whenever an actuator is set and the position of train x is in section i (i.e.

[Txi](Act(x, i)APtrain(x) = i), and the train moves (i.e., [Txi,
system must be shut down within the interval
Txi+l], i.e., [Tx„ TxM]

> i) then the
EF(Shut_Down).

The safety constraints of the controller involving sensors and actuators can be checked
as follows. The translation process creates a history for each process, where the history con
sists of a collection of tuples. In this example, each tuple contains the information of

On(x, c), Ptrain(x), Rtrain(x), Sens(c,

i),

,A
ct(xj), Shut_Down, and so

evaluation o f safety constraints against a history is performed at communication points. For

Pchecks the satisfaction of safety constraint SCI by examining the

example, process circuit-

tuples in its history Vh to see if the set n (V /(, SCI) is not empty. Appendix A shows opera
tional evaluations of assertions for processes train, circuit, and section, denoted by Ptr, Pc,
and Ps, respectively.

5.1 A M odel of Performance
To describe the overhead o f the proposed technique-operational evaluation, a theoretical
model for the train set example is presented. For comparison purpose, the translated algo
rithm or the algorithm after the translation can be rewritten in terms of the underlying algo
rithm. Let torig denote the execution of the underlying algorithm, where torig consists of com
putation time tcomp, and communication time tcomm, i.e.,

torig ~ tcomp tcomm•
Let tasser, be the overhead of operational evaluation of an assertion, i.e., tasser, denotes
the time o f finding tuples for assertion in Vh by performing n(V^, assertion). The overhead
of the translated algorithm includes torig and the cost introduced by the translation and opera
tional evaluation, described in Section 4. Then,

t trans = '^•tconip + 2,Xtconlm+ CXt

>

-

19

-

where tcomp can be considered as the maximum time to create tuples for the history Vh, tcomm
can also denote the exchanges of auxiliary variables, and Cxtasser, is the evaluation of asser
tions on C communications. Notice that tasserl, the examination of tuples in history Vh, is less
than or equal to tcomp, since only operations involving relevant information in assertions, e.g.
the state variables in Figure 5.2 for the train set example, generate tuples. Moreover, the
tuples for the previous evaluation can be removed, if we do not operationally evaluate over
lapped intervals. Thus, tassert can be rather small when the time indexes in assertions are not

textra-the cost introduced by the translation and operational e

overlapped. Therefore,
tion is
tcomp

,+

Cassert - tgrig CXt, assert •

However, most of the assertions to be evaluated, in this example, have non-overlapped time

3if
SC
: the number of consecutive sensor failures is grea
mcsf, then the system must be shut down. Thus, the tuples in Vh start to accumulate only
when consecutive sensor failures occur. Let’s say, the average length of the history Vh is 1
of the maximum length of Vh, and it takes l/Stasserl to evaluate assertions on each communi

indexes except the assertion

cation. Then,
textra = torig

For the train set example, the translation process and operational evaluation denoted by
boxed statements are shown in Appendix, where C = 7. Therefore, in the worst case, there is

(t0rig

+ 7/8tcomp) overhead than the underlying algorithm, since the parameters, tassen and

tcomp, ° f textra denote the worst case scenario.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper extends the Changeling methodology to operationally ensure responsivenessa crucial attribute of the responsive system. Since the correctness of system behavior estab
lished from the verification usually depends on the operational environment, a transformation
procedure is developed to cope with this dependency. Also, a history or a time-indexed com
putation history is generated in the translation; this history can be applied to operational eval
uation of responsiveness properties. If a history is violated, then a singal is raised. There
fore, the operational evaluation of assertions checks run-time satisfaction of expected behav
ior, and hence provides error detection-a step toward safeware safety.
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Appendix A

P s\: /* Process Section IS */
Sn:Section_Number;
Cn :Circuit_Number;
Tn:Train_Number;
/^Distances from danger zones */
Dist_DZ: integer;
Sens'.boolean; /^Signal of the sensor.*/
begin
while(true) {

{updateidKm^SiXjuiL)!
/* Sensor detects a train entering a section */
[<Signal from sensor> —> Sens:=TRUE;]

| update,Ag xsinSreev

lAt) I
jU
Y

/* evaluate state information of sensor */
/* no tuples satisfy the assertion: 7 ^ -train x on section

*/

|if n(V„, TxSJ = 0 then Error
[(Sens) -»
/*set the signal Sens to false after detection of train entering a section.*/
Sens:= false;
updatebc(gsr, g, y„,. /A
.)

Pctrain jc in Section Sn.*/

/*inform the process circuit-

(Pc\x,Sn);
1u p d a t e K n . r v , Vi,., Q
/* evaluate state information about Pc-circuit */
/* SC 1-train jc is on section Sn which is not reserved, then error */
/* SC2-Section Sn are reserved by trains x and y, then error */
if

n(Vft,SC \(T r<;n,

Tr^;) v SC2(T rSn, T v\>r), y)) = 0 then Err

/*inform the process danger zone.*/
updatehriRMX, X, V V . O l
(P DZ, x, Sn,

)D
ist_Z;]

| update ac(gsDz , g m-v<

YjuiAsI

/* evaluate state information about P DZ-danger zone*/

jif n(Vft, 5Cl(7',.y,„ 7 \^ )
}

V

SC2(Tr.<„,

y)) ^ 0 then Error|
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end while;
END.

Pc:: /^Process Circuit IS */
NOS: Set_of_Section_Numbers;
/♦max. # of consecutive sensors failure.*/
mcsf:integer;
/*NS:the set of sections that are reserved */
NS: Reservation_Flag_Table;
/*Bl:Record about NS */
/*B2 .’Record about failure sensors */
B1,B2: Reservation_Flag_Record;
No_Failure:boolean;
Cn:Circuit_Number;
Sn:Section_Number;
Tn:Train_Number;
ti: integer; //Table index.
Curr:integer;
Current: B2_Tuple;
begin
while(true) {
/*read sensor- Train Tn in Section Sn from process section-

*/

/*adds Sn to the set of section numbers-NOS.*/
| upda tc f!(.(/?f.A>,?j '; V/, , /r)

(Pslx,
Sn)->NOS := NOS + Sn;
| u p d a t e rxn, $rervi VV , tr)
/* evaluate state information of Ps, section */
/* no tuples satisfy the assertion:

-train x occupies section Sn */

if n(V „, T rS ) = 0 then Error
/* Localize_Sensor_Failure RSS 1,1,1 (rssc); */
ti :=0;
No_Failure := false;
Curr := NOS.Get;
while (ti^NS.NO_of_Entries) and -iNo_Failure {
/♦check if the section ti is reserved.*/

-

23

-

ti := ti +1;
[Curr = NS[ti].sn —> No_Failure := true;
B 1:= B l+NewJEntry(NS[ti].Tn,Curr,true);
NS:= NS-NS[ti];]
}

end while;
[(ti=NS.NO_of_Entries)

a

->No„Failure —

B2 := B2+New_Entry(NS [ti] .Tn,Curr,false);]
/*Minor_failure: section ti is not reserved and # of consecutive sensor failures is less
than mcsf.*/
[-«No_Failure a (B2.NO_of_Entries<mcsf) —> Minor_Failure
□
[->No_Failure a (B2.NO_of_Entries>mcsf) —> Major_Failure;]
Test_Reserve_Section;
NS := NS+Curr; /*section curr is reserved */
\updatehr(K,,r, g,
(No_Failure)

a

Y iu iW l

(Pln\Sn,Cn)—>true;

updatenr(grlr, g rccv, Vh., if)!
/* evaluate process train -Ptr */
if !!(¥,„ SC\{TrSn, F v-^) v SC2(TvS„, T r~X v)) = 0 then Error
}

end while;
END.

Plr\: /* Process Train IS */
Cn:Circuit_Number;
Sn, DZ:Section_Number;
/*AES:train is allowed to enter section */
/*AEDZ:train is allowed to enter danger zone(DZ) */
AES, AEDZ: CTS_Record;
begin
while(true) {
/*get permission from Circuit, move to next section */

\updatehc{glrc,g, Vh„,tlr)
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(Pc,nSC
T n );____________
updateaXtttra Srecvi

Yjlvl

2
liL

Pc*/
/* SC3: if the number of consecutive sensor failures > m csf and the system is not shut
/* evaluate process circuitdown, then error */
Iif

n(V„, SC3(Tiy„, 7,-^r, c)) = 0

then Error

AES := NEW_Entry(Cn,Sn);
[AES.Sn

±DZ -> AES := EMPTY;

□
AES.Sn = DZ —>
/*get permission from Danger Zone, move to next section-danger zone */
l»pdqfe/,r0?,fDZ, 1,^,1
[(P DZ?Sn, Cm)a (AEDZ=AES) -»
^ rt’cv ■
>

Y jk *2h r ) \

/* evaluate process danger zone-PD2 */
if

n(V,„ SC l(7\y„t r, v7i) v

SC2(TrX„, T^f), v)) = 0 then Error

AEDZ := NEW_Entry(Cn,Sn);
AES := EMPTY;
AEDZ := EMPTY;]
]
}

end while;
END.

